

## Community resources

[Follow us on Twitter](#) [Check our Reddit](#) [Twitter this](#) [Digg this page](#) [Contact us on IRC](#)

*courage is contagious*

## Viewing cable 07BEIJING7107, CONTACTS ON NEW POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the [structure of a cable](#) as well as how to [discuss them](#) with others. See also the [FAQs](#)

### Understanding cables

Every cable message consists of three parts:

- The top box shows each cable's unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
- The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
- The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables ([browse by origin](#) to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.

To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this [WikiSource](#) article as reference.

### Discussing cables

If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at the paragraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags **#cablegate** and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. **#07BEIJING7107**.

Reference ID	Created	Released	Classification	Origin
07BEIJING7107	2007-11-14 10:30	2011-08-30 01:44	CONFIDENTIAL	Embassy Beijing

Appears in these articles:

<http://www.aftenposten.no/spesial/wikileaksdokumenter/article3994543.ece>

VZCZCXRO5702  
OO RUEHCN RUEHGH RUEHVC  
DE RUEHBJ #7107/01 3181030  
ZNY CCCCC ZZH  
O 141030Z NOV 07  
FM AMEMBASSY BEIJING  
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3441  
INFO RUEHOO/CHINA POSTS COLLECTIVE  
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC  
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BEIJING 007107

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/14/2032

TAGS: [PGOV](#) [CH](#)

SUBJECT: CONTACTS ON NEW POLITBURO STANDING COMMITTEE  
MEMBER XI JINPING'S RISE, NEW LEADERSHIP LINEUP

REF: A. BEIJING 7004

[1](#)B. BEIJING 6940 (NOTAL)

[1](#)C. BEIJING 6777 AND PREVIOUS

Classified By: Political Minister Counselor Aubrey Carlson. Reasons 1.4  
(b) and (d).

Summary

-----

[1](#)1. (C) Many Embassy contacts have told Poloffs that the elevation of "fifth generation" leaders Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang to the Politburo Standing Committee is a sign of China's New Leadership: Eyes on 2012, Party Stability

[1](#)2. (C) In the wake of China's 17th Communist Party Congress and the unveiling of the Party's new leadership lineup on October 22 (Ref C), a re

[1](#)3. (C) Immediately following the unveiling of the new leaders on October 22, XXXXXXXXXXXX, an official in XXXXXXXXXXXX with close ties to Central Committee member Xi Jinping's Popularity

[1](#)4. (C) The decision to elevate former Shanghai Party Secretary Xi Jinping to the PBSC, and to rank him ahead of purported Hu Jintao favorite I

[1](#)5. (C) Zhang Zhiyun of the CCP International Liaison Department provided the official propaganda line on the June 25 "vote" when on October 24

[1](#)6. (C) The sources of Xi's purported popularity are said to be many. First, several contacts pointed to Xi's status as son of Xi Zhongxun, an

Xi as "Compromise Candidate"

[1](#)7. (C) While Xi's popularity and broad support certainly played a role in his elevation, several contacts stressed these factors came into play

[1](#)8. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX separately told Poloff that he also understood that Zeng Qinghong's stepping down was part of a "package deal" to elevate Hu Jintao, Protecting Princeling Interests

[1](#)9. (C) Other contacts emphasized the desire to check the influence of Hu Jintao and the CYL and the perceived need to protect "princeling" interests by comparing Xi to Li Keqiang

[1](#)10. (C) While such "factional" balancing appears to have played a key role in the decision to elevate Xi ahead of Li, contacts have said Li Ke

[1](#)11. (C) Contacts who underscored Li's strengths similarly noted that CYL stereotypes and his career background worked against him. XXXXXXXXXXXX

[1](#)12. (C) In the end, XXXXXXXXXXXX opined, neither Xi nor Li are "ideal" leaders in a "scientific" sense, given that both are relatively junior officials. Speculation on Impending Government Appointments

[1](#)13. (C) Two contacts speculated on the impending high-level government personnel changes slated for the March 2008 National People's Congress

[1](#)14. (C) Well-connected XXXXXXXXXXXX told Poloff that XXXXXXXXXXXX. (Note: XXXXXXXXXXXX said. XXXXXXXXXXXX. The CDIC portfolio is "incredibly c

[1](#)15. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX said that his impression is that Hu Guoqiang has a "relatively favorable" attitude toward the United States, believing that Li Yuanchao's "Huge Step Up"

[1](#)16. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX provided Poloffs with comments on Li Yuanchao, the former Jiangsu Party Secretary and Hu Jintao protege who was recently promoted to